

# **Global Navigation Satellite System** (GNSS) Vulnerabilities: From Jamming to Spoofing

Gian Andrea Bandieri WORC 2024 Warsaw, 3 July 2024


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# **GNSS Robustness issue**




### jamming


**EASA** 

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spoofing

**Evolution** 













Area with low altitude spoofing













# **GNSS interference: safety or security issue?**

- $\rightarrow$  Intentional action
- → Most likely, the effect of Electronic Warfare (EW)
- $\rightarrow$  Civil aviation not the primary target





## What is EASA doing (safety side)



# SIB 2022-02 Revision 3

- New type of events reported:
  - → spoofing during departure and arrival procedures,
  - → uncoordinated high rate of climb in reaction to spurious alerts of terrain and traffic collision avoidance systems

- → spurious traffic collision avoidance system alerts
- 2. Stressing that spoofing is riskier than jamming.
- 3. FIRs updated
- 4. Recommendations updated

→ In some cases, the risk has increased. However, an unsafe condition is not confirmed at this stage



# **Monitoring the situation – recent events**

#### **Baltic states**

- → FINNAIR temporarily stopped operation at TARTU (EETU)
  - $\rightarrow$  TARTU is for GNSS capable aircraft only. No backup available
  - $\rightarrow$  FINNAIR will resume operation as soon as alternative means is available
  - → For EASA it is not an unsafe situation. 2 flights diverted to an alternate destination resilient to GNSS outages

#### East Mediterranean Sea

- → increase of GPS spoofing occurrences with impacts on aircraft performance are recorded since December 2023
- → Contrarily to other regions, spoofing is active during low altitude operations (STARs, approaches, landing, taxi, takeoff, SIDs)
- → Unpredictable aircraft behaviors are recorded:
  - $\rightarrow$  Aircraft difficulties to fly conventionally (i.e. non GNSS)
  - $\rightarrow$  Deviation from SIDs and STARs
- $\rightarrow$  Aircraft deviation from ATC clearance

Misleading TCAS (TAs), rare but

- → Aircraft reporting numerous systems malfunctions (Clock, Fuel, FMS, Map Shift, TAWS, TCAS)
  - ightarrow Aircraft uncoordinated climbs in response to TAWS alerts with very high rates of climb

### Is that all?

- → GNSS interference is the evident effect of Electronic Warfare on civil aviation
- → Probably there might be additional effects due to EW, not fully known today
- → Symptoms being occasionally noted:
  - $\rightarrow$  Latching effect on receivers  $\rightarrow$  INOP
  - $\rightarrow$  Other systems showing spurious alerts: EGPWS, TCAS, ...

→ The full impact of EW on aircraft systems is yet to be fully understood..
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